Maastricht: nessun prosecco

 

 Da Brave New Europe, 1 febbraio 2022

Sergio Cesaratto – The anniversary of Maastricht: little to celebrate

The Maastricht Treaty was signed on 9 February 1992. Thirty years later it is responsible for much suffering, inequality, and poverty within the fragile eurozone.

Sergio Cesaratto teaches European monetary and fiscal policies at the University of Siena. He is author of Heterodox Challenges in Economics – Theoretical Issues and the Crisis of the Eurozone, Springer, 2020 (reviewed by BNE here).

The Italian version of the article will be appearing in Micromega

 

 

 

I leave it to historians to reconstruct the international and Italian events that led to the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (1992). Let us look here at some economic aspects in order to judge whether or not this treaty made any sense.

Lectures in Monetary Theory and Policy

 The November Lectures in Monetary Theory and Policy: Recent History and Contemporary Issues, given at the Higher School of Economics are now uploaded to Youtube at  

https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCgRjyvJG4zZgXj8ThLBGSfg/videos

 
 

Video della presentazione delle Sei lezioni sulla moneta (starring Maurizio Zenezini)

 Video presentazione 18 dicembre 2021.

oppure copia e incolla

 https://www.facebook.com/101082411613150/videos/380739933807905

 

On a book by ECB's economists

 

An ECB’s Staff Narrative of Two Decades of European Central Banking: a critical review

Working Paper n.866 Dicembre 2021

Sergio Cesaratto

DEPS, USiena

Abstract

Monetary Policy in Times of Crisis (Rostagno et al. 2021) has three relevant features. The first is its criticism of the absence of an adequate European fiscal policy during the financial crisis. This left the ECB on its own. The second feature concerns the explanation of the theoretical framework that guided the ECB's action. While it is interesting that the authors point out that monetary policy acts on the demand side (and is therefore neutral neither in the short nor in the long-run), a plain explanation of the channels through which the central bank can influence demand is absent. The third feature is the chronicle of events and of the clash of positions within the ECB. This aspect would have, however, gained from a bolder and less conventional interpretative scheme. The book thus appears to be lacking both in a clear exposition of the ECB's analytical background and its evolution during the crisis, and in a comprehensive explanation of its policies. It is likely that the authors' economic training based on the neo-Keynesian mainstream model has greatly conditioned them in a technically convoluted, but too often uninspiring interpretation of events and policies. It is also possible that the difficulty of demonstrating the effectiveness of the monetary policy measures undertaken by the ECB in the absence of a proactive fiscal policy contributed to the widespread technical laboriousness of the argument in many pages of the book. Especially for academic teaching, but also for the informed public debate, a more accessible level would have been advisable. An appendix seeks to explain T-LTRO operations, the logic of which the book fails to elucidate.

Jel Codes

E11, E12, E52, E58, N14

LINK to  PDF here

Those Italian subsidies for Germany

 

Sergio Cesaratto – Those Italian subsidies for Germany

December 8, 2021 Economics, EU politics, EU-Institutions, Finance, Inequality, National Politics, Regulation

Italy has paid for certain ill-advised policies of the ECB – influenced by Berlin, the dominant power in Europe – with dozens of points of additional debt/GDP and finding itself ever poorer, while Germany symmetrically gained.

Sergio Cesaratto teaches European monetary and fiscal policies at the University of Siena. He is author of Heterodox Challenges in Economics – Theoretical Issues and the Crisis of the Eurozone, Springer, 2020 (reviewed by BNE here).

Originally published by Micromega 3 December 2021 here

Quei sussidi italiani alla Germania

 

Quei sussidi italiani alla Germania

Sergio Cesaratto da Micromega online Dicembre 3, 2021 

 English version here

L’Italia ha pagato certe sciagurate politiche della BCE – influenzate da Berlino, potenza dominante in Europa – con decine di punti di debito/PIL in più e trovandosi ancor più povera, mentre la Germania simmetricamente ci guadagnava.

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Già nella prima edizione delle Sei lezioni di economia denunciavo l’enorme risparmio nella spesa per interessi che il governo tedesco lucrava dalla fuga di capitali dai titoli di stato italiani verso quelli tedeschi, considerati più sicuri.[1] Un istituto tedesco aveva all’epoca quantificato tale risparmio in 100 miliardi di euro. Nell’edizione inglese del 2020 citavo l’autorevole membro tedesco del consiglio esecutivo della BCE, Isabel Schnabel che quantificava nel febbraio 2020 i risparmi di spesa per Berlino in 400 miliardi di euro dal 2017. Questo non solo, naturalmente, in seguito alla fuga dai titoli italiani, che si era progressivamente calmata dal celebre intervento di Draghi del 2012, ma soprattutto per le misure di acquisto di titoli pubblici avviata dalla BCE dal marzo 2015. Questi acquisti erano soprattutto indirizzati a mettere in sicurezza i titoli ad alto debito, come quelli italiani. Ma poiché la BCE deve agire erga omnes, ad avvantaggiarsene furono, ancora una volta, anche i titoli tedeschi. Insomma, vantaggi dalle disgrazie altrui, magari non espressamente cercati, ma comunque evidenti. Disgrazie nei confronti delle quali non si è però innocenti, se è vero che Berlino è stata la principale ispiratrice delle disgraziate politiche fiscali e dell’inazione della BCE sino alla Presidenza Draghi nel 2011, ma nei fatti anche oltre continuando a frenare l’azione della banca centrale.

The hawks’ trick to make Italy fall into a trap

 

Sergio Cesaratto – The hawks’ trick to make Italy fall into a trap

November 3, 2021 Economics, EU politics, EU-Institutions, Finance, National Politics, Regulation

The future of European governance is still being discussed, but not in Italy. Italy runs the risk of being trapped in deceptively lenient rules

Sergio Cesaratto is Professor of Growth and Development Economics and of Monetary and Fiscal Policies in the European Monetary Union, University of Siena. His newest book, “Heterodox Challenges in Economics – Theoretical Issues and the Crisis of the Eurozone” was recently published by Springer Read our review here

Interview by Lorenzo Torrisi

The original Italian version at Il Sussidiario can be read here

Translated by BRAVE NEW EUROPE

Valdis Dombrovskis and Paolo Gentiloni (LaPresse)

In the week that has just ended, the issue of the future of the Stability and Growth Pact rules, which are still suspended, has resurfaced. The German newspaper Handelsblatt published an exclusive report on the contents of a document drawn up by economists supporting the European Stability Mechanism, suggesting a change in the debt/GDP parameter from 60% to 100%, while leaving the deficit/GDP parameter unchanged at 3%.

Would this be a positive change for Italy? According to Sergio Cesaratto, Professor of European Monetary and Fiscal Policy at the University of Siena, who has just published “Sei lezioni sulla moneta – La politica monetaria com’è e come viene raccontata” (Diarkos), “such a proposal could be misleading in that it is apparently more realistic. The reduction in 20 years of the debt/GDP ratio to 60% envisaged by the Fiscal Compact of 2012 has remained an unimplemented measure because it is unrealistic.