Intervista su Brave New Europe

 

  Thanks to my friend Mathew Rose, uno strano americano a Berlino.

Interview with Sergio Cesaratto: Draghi and the Italian Melodrama

Brave New Europe, February 7, 2021

Sergio Cesaratto is Professor of Growth and Development Economics and of Monetary and Fiscal Policies in the European Monetary Union, University of Siena. Many of the topics of this conversation are developed in his latest book: Sergio Cesaratto, Heterodox Challenges in Economics – Theoretical Issues and the Crisis of the Eurozone, Springer, 2020, http://www.springer.com/9783030544478 that will be reviewed on BRAVE NEW EUROPE in the near future.

Can we say that the “Vincolo Esterno”, the neo-liberal EU straitjacket Italy’s oligarchy and technocrats imposed on their nation, has failed or has it achieved the success they sought – or has it done both?

Both. It succeeded in the sense that an icy discipline descended on the working classes, trade unions and fiscal policy. It failed in the sense that discipline brought with it the stalling of growth, later aggravated by the 2008 crisis and the pandemic. Many foreign readers do not know that Italy has a record of discipline in public accounts, measured by budget surpluses net of interest expenditure, unbroken from 1991 until the pandemic. This, together with the loss of a competitive exchange rate, has led to stagnating productivity and growth in Italy since 1995. Public debt was reduced from 120 to 100 % of GDP before the 2008 crisis. But at a very high price (cuts make growth less and nullify the budgetary effects of cuts in a Sisyphean effort). No country in Europe has been as frugal as Italy (read https://www.ineteconomics.org/research/research-papers/lost-in-deflation). Moreover, private debt is very low in Italy, Italian households are also frugal, contrary to what is portrayed in Northern European media.

Nuovo Working paper su Asimmetrie

 Paper appena pubbliato da Asimmetrie.org che ringrazio per ospitalità e sostegno finanziario.

 

Alternative Interpretations of a Stateless Currency crisis 

Sergio Cesaratto 

Abstract

A number of economists holding Keynesian or pragmatic monetarist views warned that political union was a necessary premise for a viable monetary union. Inspired by Goodhart, we name this the Cartalist view. The European currency union was, however, strongly influenced by New Classical Macroeconomics, which gave new strength to older traditions, like ordoliberalism, that back separation of monetary and fiscal policy, legitimizing a Stateless currency. Again like Goodhart, we call this the Metallist view. This distinction is particularly relevant for assessing two alternative perspectives of the nature of the Euro area crisis. On one hand, there are those who argue that the crisis is akin to a traditional balance of payment crisis of the kind typically occurring in fixed exchange rate regimes. On the other, there are those who attribute the crisis to obstacles to more resolute intervention by the European Central Bank (ECB). Accordingly, belated intervention by the ECB led to worsening of the fiscal crisis of peripheral Euro area states, subsequently exacerbated by austerity policies. In this view, a classical balance of payment crisis can be excluded as a cause of the crisis, because Target 2, a payment mechanism analogous to Keynes’s International Clearing Union, protects the Euro area. In this paper, I argue that although a balance of payments crisis cannot exist in a viable sovereign monetary union, it is still conceivable in a flawed, stateless monetary union like the Euro zone, possibly obscured by Target 2. In this regard, I also show that, while timely and resolute ECB intervention would have been appropriate, in the absence of federal institutions (particularly a federal budget controlled by a European democratic parliament), once this intervention finally took place, austerity measures necessarily accompanied it to check moral hazard possibilities of peripheral member countries. I argue that the German neo-mercantilist orientation and the influence of the predominant mainstream credo that monetary policy should be detached from politics and fiscal policy are obstacles to a viable federal union. I also warn about the risk that the Parliament of such a union would be divided according to national rather than ideological/class interests. Virtue out of necessity, Hayek pointed out long-ago that a currency union among different nation-States could only survive with a minimalist federal State.