The economic and social consequences of the war on Europe and Italy

 

Sergio Cesaratto – The economic and social consequences of the war on Europe and Italy

Brave New Europe, May 12, 2022

Political realism offers useful keys to interpreting the international political economy, which has never been more endangered than today by the military escalation in Ukraine. The EU and Italy risk to be the pots and pans in the unprecedented economic crisis looming ahead.

Sergio Cesaratto teaches European monetary and fiscal policies at the University of Siena. He is author of Heterodox Challenges in Economics – Theoretical Issues and the Crisis of the Eurozone, Springer, 2020 (reviewed by BNE here).

Adapted from the Italian version of the article that appeared in fuori collana

THE EU CRISIS AND EUROPE’S DIVIDED MEMORIES

Pubblichiamo d'accordo con la rivista "Ricerche Storiche" l'estratto di un'importante intervista a tre noti intellettuali, G. Eley, L. Paggi e W. Streeck. Ringrazio il prof. Spagnolo e Leonardo Paggi  per l'onore. Speriamo a breve in una traduzione in italiano.

THE EU CRISIS AND EUROPE’S DIVIDED MEMORIES

Excerpts from an interview by C. Spagnolo (Univ. Bari) with Geoff ELEY, Univ. of Michigan (G.E.), Leonardo PAGGI, Univ. of Modena (L.P.), and Wolfgang STREECK, Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Köln (W.S.), to be published in “Le memorie divise dell’Europa dal 1945”, monographic issue of the Journal "Ricerche Storiche", n. 2/2017.

Target due sulla natura della crisi europea

Nakedkeynesianism ha pubblicato questa ulteriore nota sulla discussione con Marc Lavoie, che spero non mi citi in tribunale per stolking. Ma Marc è una persona amabile.

Unlimited Targets? Some pointers

Sergio Cesaratto

In this short note I will not add anything of substantial to the debate with Marc Lavoie on the nature of the Eurozone (EZ) crisis in view of Target 2 (T2). Readers have numerous papers to look at (including Lavoie 2015a/b,  Cesaratto 2013, 2015a/b) and posts (Vernengo 2015, Ramanan, 2015a/b). Links in the references. However, although most of relevance has already  been said, there is perhaps still some space for few qualifications.

Nuovo Working paper su Asimmetrie

 Paper appena pubbliato da Asimmetrie.org che ringrazio per ospitalità e sostegno finanziario.

 

Alternative Interpretations of a Stateless Currency crisis 

Sergio Cesaratto 

Abstract

A number of economists holding Keynesian or pragmatic monetarist views warned that political union was a necessary premise for a viable monetary union. Inspired by Goodhart, we name this the Cartalist view. The European currency union was, however, strongly influenced by New Classical Macroeconomics, which gave new strength to older traditions, like ordoliberalism, that back separation of monetary and fiscal policy, legitimizing a Stateless currency. Again like Goodhart, we call this the Metallist view. This distinction is particularly relevant for assessing two alternative perspectives of the nature of the Euro area crisis. On one hand, there are those who argue that the crisis is akin to a traditional balance of payment crisis of the kind typically occurring in fixed exchange rate regimes. On the other, there are those who attribute the crisis to obstacles to more resolute intervention by the European Central Bank (ECB). Accordingly, belated intervention by the ECB led to worsening of the fiscal crisis of peripheral Euro area states, subsequently exacerbated by austerity policies. In this view, a classical balance of payment crisis can be excluded as a cause of the crisis, because Target 2, a payment mechanism analogous to Keynes’s International Clearing Union, protects the Euro area. In this paper, I argue that although a balance of payments crisis cannot exist in a viable sovereign monetary union, it is still conceivable in a flawed, stateless monetary union like the Euro zone, possibly obscured by Target 2. In this regard, I also show that, while timely and resolute ECB intervention would have been appropriate, in the absence of federal institutions (particularly a federal budget controlled by a European democratic parliament), once this intervention finally took place, austerity measures necessarily accompanied it to check moral hazard possibilities of peripheral member countries. I argue that the German neo-mercantilist orientation and the influence of the predominant mainstream credo that monetary policy should be detached from politics and fiscal policy are obstacles to a viable federal union. I also warn about the risk that the Parliament of such a union would be divided according to national rather than ideological/class interests. Virtue out of necessity, Hayek pointed out long-ago that a currency union among different nation-States could only survive with a minimalist federal State.

Un commento dalla Grecia (in inglese)

SYRIZA betrays the resounding NO vote of the Greek people and signs a 3^rd troika austerity program

The Left should create a popular front against the EU

Stavros Mavroudeas

 Professor of Political Economy

In the 5^th of July 2015 the huge majority of the Greek people (61%) rejected the insolent demands of the EU for the extension and deepening of the austerity and pro-capital restructuring policies in Greece. These demands were codified in the so-called Juncker Plan for Greece that set barbaric terms for the extension of the previous austerity program (the 2^nd Economic Adjustment Program for Greece) in exchange for releasing much delayed tranches of the troika loans to Greece. These tranches were urgently needed for repaying instalments of previous loans by the troika. As I have argued in a previous note (‘The Greek referendum and the tasks of the Left’) SYRIZA was led unwillingly to call this referendum because of the failure of its unrealistic program for a ‘decent compromise’ with the EU and for ‘staying in the Eurozone at any cost’. Moreover, the whole affair proved beyond any doubt that EU is a capitalist and imperialist integration that cannot be reformed towards serving peoples’ needs.

Ramanan su Cesaratto su Lavoie

Io scrivo poco ora, ma per fortuna su quel poco c'è chi scrive su di me, come l'amico Ramanan, uno dei più attivi blogger postkeynesiani.

The Case For Concerted Action

Post-Keynesian Ideas For A Crisis That Conventional Remedies Cannot Resolve

Sergio Cesaratto’s Debate With Marc Lavoie On Whether The Euro Area Crisis Is A Balance-Of-Payments Crisis

by Ramanan on 22 December 2014

Sergio Cesaratto has a new paper Balance Of Payments Or Monetary Sovereignty? In Search Of The EMU’s Original Sin – A Reply To Lavoie. (html link, pdf link)
I obviously agree with Sergio Cesaratto.
As long as there is no supranational fiscal authority, a Euro Area nation’s economic success is more restricted by its exports than otherwise as there is no mechanism for fiscal transfers. The European Central bank can of course backstop and to some extent it has done so, but it cannot let fiscal policy of nations become independent of balance of payments beyond a certain extent. If it does so, nations’ public debt will rise together with net indebtedness to foreigners relative to output and this will become unsustainable. The European Central Bank (the Eurosystem less the domestic National Central Bank) will become a huge creditor and this will not be acceptable to the rest of the Euro Area. (There is of course the question whether this would be morally right but I do not think it is immoral beyond a limit).
To some extent, Mario Draghi has acted the opposite and pushed austerity, but one cannot assume unlimited power for the ECB (Eurosystem to be precise).

Cesaratto and the MMT (in Italian and English)

Pubblico due video. Il primo è un dibattito fra Warren Mosler e me tenuto a Siena lo scorso 14 marzo. Il successivo è un video-intervista a Randall Wray (con sottotioli in italiano), parte di una serie di 6 video. Queso riprende le mie critiche all'MMT circa il vincolo estero (gli intervistatori esplicitamente richiamavano le mie critiche). Segue un mio commento in italiano e in inglese (lo riprendo da Face book e quindi è nello stile frettoloso di FB). A giorni sarà registrata una mia intervista di risposta a Wray.
Two videos: a debate held in Siena 14 March between Warren Mosler and me (he speaks in English I speak in Italian): then an interview to Wray (with Italian subtitles). Below you will find some quick reactions to him (in Italian and English) on Randy's interpretation of the Eurozone crisis. A video-reply will be recorded soon.

E' la crisi dell'eurozona una crisi di bilancia dei pagamenti? Is the Eurozone crisis a BoP crisis?

Parlatene male, ma parlatene.
Un po' di controversia internazionale - che mi aspettavo - sul mio paper su Target 2 e la crisi europea come crisi di bilancia dei pagamenti. Chi mi critica è (ops!) un MMT. Grazie al mio amico Ramanan (un noto blogger indiano) per la difesa della mia tesi, sia nei commenti a Plikington che nel suo ottimo blog Concerted action.Grazie naturalmente anche a Pilkington per l'attenzione.

CRITICHE http://fixingtheeconomists.wordpress.com/2013/08/31/can-a-country-without-a-currency-have-a-currency-crisis/
RAMANAN http://www.concertedaction.com/2013/08/31/balance-payments-crises/

Con l'occasione (e a proposito di India), il mio amico Bergamini mi segnala questa intervista di Jayati Gosh, una straordinaria economista indiana, il termine inglese "sharp" rende perfettamente l'idea. Utile e chiara sulla crisi indiana (e cinese).
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/indian-economist-jayati-ghosh-warns-of-chaos-and-violence-a-919048.html#js-article-comments-box-pager

A little of international controversy - that I expected - on my paper on Target 2 and the Eurozone crisis as a BoP crisis. The critic is (ops) an MMT. Thanks to my friend Ramanan to take my defence both in his comments and in his blog. Thanks also to Pilkington, of course, for paying attention to my paper.

I take this occasion to suggest an interview to the always sharp Jayati Gosh from Spiegel on the current troubles in India (and China).

PIGS in MADRID - la mia introduzione al meeting (in English)

 Pubblichiamo la mia relazione introduttiva al Meeting di Madrid. Qui materiali usciti in Spagna in merito su Pubblico.es (quotidiano on line qui e qui):  L'appello "Irlandese" è nel frattempo stato pubblicato da Pagina 12, un diffuso quotidiano argentino (oltre che su vari siti internazionali).
Aggiornamenti: meeting riuscitissimo, grande sala piena di ragazzi per tutta la mattinata, e poi nel pomeriggio per la loro discussione. Bel clima di amicizia e cameratismo come solo i ragazzi fra loro possono creare. Oggi seconda giornata. Torneremo con alcune riflessioni in merito (e qualche foto). Qui intanto le notizie, ricche, uscite sulla stampa nazionale on line:

http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2012/11/22/actualidad/1353603852_983770.html

http://www.publico.es/espana/446296/necesitamos-una-respuesta-social-desde-la-periferia-europea

http://www.eldiario.es/economia/Jovenes-alternativas_0_71743224.html

I video sono qui, probabilmente ne verranno messi altri migliori.

PIGS in Madrid

Sergio Cesaratto

Cesaratto@unisi.it

Dear students and colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, companeros y companeras (if I am allowed to say so),

I wish first of all to thank the organisers and the supporters of this event.[1] I believe this is a beautiful opportunity to work side by side with the young people who are fighting against the present state of things and the critical economists. This is not a conference against Europe, or of one part of Europe against the other. As people of “troubled Europe” we feel perhaps more concerned than the majority of our northern fellows. But I think that the message of this meeting should arrive especially at your young northern fellows not just asking for solidarity (a word that I personally look suspiciously at), but because the dismantlement of the social rights in our countries might be the premise to the reduction in their own. I believe that they would defend the idea of their countries being part of a peaceful and prosper continent, and be outraged by the idea of their countries as islands in the midst of deprivation and resentment. I also believe that  youth is the time of hope and generosity, the time in which the outrage for social injustice is felt the most. So I hope that our messages, the messages from the young people here, will arrive at the most sensible ears of northern Europe, those of the young people there (let us not forget here the young socialists massacred by the crazy Nazi guy  in Norway). It is particularly important that, through any possible channel, more information about the situation in our countries be directed at the likely victims of disinformation, be they youths of Germany, Austria, the Netherlands etc,. We should take some initiative in this direction.

Replica a Wray - Parte 2

Ecco la seconda parte. La risposta di Wray è qui http://www.economonitor.com/lrwray/2012/08/29/minsky-and-mmt-in-the-news/. Utile perché contrappone due scuole: Kaldor-Thirlwall per i quali il vincolo della bilancia dei pagamenti è l'ostacolo principale alla crescita, l'altra (l'MMT) secondo cui con una moneta sovrana, oplà, il problema scompare.

A reply to Wray - Part 2

“The EMU could easily have self-destructed even with no current account deficits anywhere.” (Wray here)

“Trade issues within the eurozone …will remain a point of economic and political stress even with a full resolution of the liquidity issues…” (Warren Mosler)

In the part 1 I reviewed the MMT view that full monetary sovereignty is the key to full employment policies in all countries, provided that those with current account (CA) troubles have safe access to alternative sources of foreign liquidity - what is not the case in reality. I also examined the MMT’s claim that the Eurozone (EZ) cannot suffer from internal balance of payment (BoP) troubles as long as fiscal transfers from a significant federal budget backed by a genuine European CB are provided - what again is not the case in reality. In this post we shall return on Wray’s denial of the BoP origin of the EZ crisis. I agree with Wray, Bell-Kelton and other MMTs that in a currency union local states are partially deprived of fiscal policy as a tool to sustain aggregate demand[1]  (without forgetting that this power is anyway in many countries subject to the foreign constraint even with full monetary sovereignty), while the institutional design of the EMU is not able to assure full employment and the preservation of the traditional European welfare state in a non-OCA. As Godley 1991 pointed out:

“The fact that individual countries no longer have their own currencies and central banks will put new constraints on their ability to run independent fiscal policies. However, the collective formulation of fiscal policy would be a far more difficult business than passive ‘coordination’. Fiscal policies of the whole Community could be co-ordinated and expansionary: but they could also be co-ordinated and contractionary. How is the common formulation of fiscal policy to be achieved? By what institutions and according to what principles?”

But Godley found even

“more disturbing … the notion that with a common currency the ‘balance or payments problem’ is eliminated and therefore that individual countries are relieved of the need to pay for their imports with exports. Quite the reverse: the existence or a common currency makes a country more directly dependent on its ability to sell exports and import substitutes than it was before, particularly as it will then possess no means whereby it can (in the broadest sense) protect itself against failure” (hat tip to Ramanan).

Indeed, the crisis did not stem from an undisciplined fiscal behaviour of some peripheral countries  – they knew very well that “markets” would have punished them (the EMU was designed for this purpose) – but from the loss of competitiveness of some member countries, as Godley feared, and from some additional events brought about by monetary unification that nobody (with one exception) foresaw.

Replica a Randall Wray - Parte 1

 Nakedkeynesianism ha appena pubblicato la prima parte della mia risposta a Wray, e a seguire inserirà la seconda. Certamente degli amici italiani le tradurranno. Buona lettura. La risposta di Wray è qui http://www.economonitor.com/lrwray/2012/08/29/minsky-and-mmt-in-the-news/. Utile perché contrappone due scuole: Kaldor-Thirlwall per i quali il vincolo della bilancia dei pagamenti è l'ostacolo principale alla crescita, l'altra (l'MMT) secondo cui con una moneta sovrana, oplà, il problema scompare.

A reply to Wray - Part 1

 “The fact that individual countries no longer have their own currencies and central banks will put new constraints on their ability to run independent fiscal policies. … But more disturbing still is the notion that with a common currency the ‘balance or payments problem’ is eliminated and therefore that individual countries are relieved of the need to pay for their imports with exports. Quite the reverse: the existence or a common currency makes a country more directly dependent on its ability to sell exports and import substitutes than it was before…”. Godley 1991

There are two aspects of the discussion that has taken place in the last weeks (here, here, here, here). The first mainly concerns my first post and regards whether monetary sovereignty is a condition both necessary and sufficient for any country to pursue development and full employment policies; the second concerns the Eurozone (EZ) crisis and was the subject of my second post. Wray mainly focuses on the second issue, and I will do the same. In part 1 of my reply I will, however, briefly dwell on the first aspect that is anyway preliminary and which will lead us to touch upon the EZ troubles anyway. The two questions we deal with in part 1 will, respectively, be: are balance of payments (BoP) preoccupations irrelevant for countries endowed with full monetary sovereignty? Can a currency union suffer of internal BoP troubles? Part 2 will then be devoted to Wray’s explanation(s) of the EZ crisis.

Una nuova critica a Wray e all'MMT

Nakedkeynesianism ha pubblicato una mia nota critica (ma non ostile) a Wray e agli MMT (grazie Matias!). Nonostante essi ritengano di aver capito per primi la crisi europea, questo non è vero, sebbene ne abbiano capito prima di altri un elemento importante e di ciò gli va dato atto (ci mancherebbe). L'elemento è la rinuncia a una banca sovrana da parte degli stati nazionali. Il problema è che i toni che usano gli impediscono un dialogo sereno, non accorgendosi della parzialità delle loro tesi (a mio avviso, nel complesso, la crisi europea non l'hanno capita). In fondo v'è un po' di discussione (grazie Ramanan!).

(further, further discussion here and here)

Degli amici stanno procedendo alla traduzione in italiano.

The spurious victory of MMT

Sergio Cesaratto (Guest Blogger)

In a widely read blog aggregator Randy Wray has declared victory of MMT and that we are all MMTs by now. Victory on who? And I personally do not feel MMT, or better I feel MMT, Sraffian, Kaleckian, Marxist and many other things, each taken with a degree of salt. Fanaticism and over-excitement is not part of heterodox Economics, let alone of academic work, and the fact that Wray got so nervous after a initial critical comment by a reader is telling that we might be far away from a cool and equilibrate economic dialogue. MMT has provided a lot of important insights, as other approaches, about the European crisis. Also intellectual adversaries like Werner Sinn have contributed to our understanding of the crisis, in this case over the role of Target 2 (that for the first time or so Wray mentions). MMT has, indeed, missed the main feature of the EZ crisis: its nature of a balance of payment crisis. Anyway, I do not see the MMT explanation as alternative, but as complementary to the BoP crisis view. In this regard, more modesty would help everybody in our common scientific and political enterprise. While my own view of the EZ crisis as a BoP crisis is here (this WP is a longer version of an article in a book that will be published likely by Routledge, a blog version is here), below you can find some critical remarks on the MMT view of the EZ crisis part of a longer paper that will be published in Spanish. These remarks develop a bit further the post on MMT already published here which is also a section of the WP. Having said so, I am ready to acknowledge that along Godley 1992, De Grauwe 1998, Kelton and Wray (and few others like Barba and Pivetti) have provided prescient predictions of the forthcoming crisis, each emphasises one aspect of it.